All over the world, governments are compelling water utilities to improve their efficiency and productivity through reforms and tougher regulatory tools. Despite the different strategies and approaches, the goals remain the same: to make the whole sector more efficient, to curb the profits and 'quiet life' of water utilities and pass the productivity gains to customers through reduced prices or better environmental protection and quality of service. The water sectors in Portugal and Italy underwent deep reforms in the 1990s, in pursuit of higher levels of performance. Therefore, there is added interest in measuring the performance of water utilities in these two Mediterranean countries. We assess their performance using composite (global) indicators on a sample of 88 water utilities, for the year 2007. While we compare the performance of the two countries in this sector we also try to identify the impact of the ownership structure on efficiency. Finally, this paper discusses the benchmarking results of our research and draws some policy implications.
Introduction
Cross-national comparisons have several appealing features. First of all, the possibility of having a larger database to identify international best practices and provide added incentives to utility managers is noteworthy. In addition, gathering empirical evidence on how each country is performing in overall terms might provide better guidance for national politicians and regulators.the comparability of the data (Araral, 2010) . Moreover, fluctuations in purchasing power parity, different levels of outsourcing, specific differences (such as water source or customer density) and other contrasts such as wages, taxes and tariff rules often hinder the validity of findings (De Witte & Marques, 2010) . Bearing this in mind, we compare two Mediterranean countries, Portugal and Italy, which have similar characteristics such as climate, legislation and institutional framework, increasing the comparability of the water utilities. Nevertheless, one should note that there are also some differences such as the scale and model of management, the actual role of local government and different degrees of vertical integration. Moreover, these two countries experienced different reforms in the water sector in the 1990s and, despite sharing the same main objectives, the actual strategies adopted were quite dissimilar. These differences and similarities are addressed in the following section.
In this study we compute the efficiency scores of 33 Italian utilities and 55 Portuguese utilities providing drinking water and wastewater services, using the benchmarking non-parametric technique of data envelopment analysis (DEA) with two different model specifications. Hence we are able to suggest which country may be performing better (in overall terms) in this sector, with regard to the strategies adopted. Furthermore, since we have information on the organizational model of each utility, we offer some insights into the efficiency of different governance structures.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we briefly describe the Portuguese and Italian water sectors. In the third section, we provide a brief literature review regarding performance measurement issues and present some interesting findings in this context. The data, models and results are presented in the fourth section, whilst the discussion and concluding remarks appear in the fifth and final section.
Water sector

The Portuguese case
As in other Mediterranean countries (including in Italy), the availability of water resources in Portugal is seasonal. Usually an abundance of water in winter contrasts with its shortage in the summer. In the Portuguese case, there are also some geographical differences: while the north and coastal areas have abundant water resources, the south and inland countryside suffer from water shortage problems. All water services (drinking water supply as well as wastewater collection and treatment) are a responsibility of local governments. In comparison to other countries, one major difference is the fact that both the water and wastewater sectors are not, as a rule, vertically integrated. Indeed, the 'wholesale' (water intake, treatment and transportation and wastewater treatment) and 'retail' (water distribution and wastewater collection) markets are managed by distinct entities, as a result of a major reform in the 1990s. It was only during that decade that private sector participation (by means of concession arrangements) was allowed in the water sector. Another crucial difference is the presence of a sector-specific regulator (in the EU-15 these authorities only exist in Portugal, Italy and the UK). However, until recently, the Water and Waste Services Regulation Authority (ERSAR, in the Portuguese acronym) has only had regulatory power over concessionary companies (contractual public-private and public-public partnership arrangements), especially regarding quality issues. This regulatory agency adopted a 'sunshine regulation' approach, which consists of the comparison and public discussion of operator performance ('naming and shaming' weak performers and identifying best practices).
Currently, 21 utilities operate in the 'wholesale' market: three providing just drinking water, six providing just wastewater services and 12 providing drinking water and wastewater services together. One of these entities is a private concessionaire while the other 20 are public concessionaires (entities simultaneously owned by the central state and by the municipalities covered; see Marques, 2008) .
There are 279 utilities in the 'retail' market. The most common governance model in this segment is the municipal department (207 units, representing 43% of the population). The other models observed are municipal services with autonomy (still with direct public management but the entities have separate accounts), municipal companies (100% public or mixed companies, such as institutionalized PPPs (iPPPs)), concessionary companies (cPPPs), public-public partnerships (between the central state and the municipalities) and one state-owned company (EPAL, which operates in Lisbon).
Despite the legal responsibilities of local governments regarding water and wastewater services, the significant presence of the central state in the sector is remarkable. However, private sector participation has been increasing lately. Today, 21% of the Portuguese population is supplied via PPP agreements (mixed companies and concessions). Indeed, Portuguese local governments have been turning to municipal companies and to cPPP arrangements to a greater extent (Cruz & Marques, 2011) . The effects of this strategy are not clear. On the one hand, publicly-owned utilities seem to attain higher efficiencies (a static measure); on the other hand, private utilities appear to show higher productivity (a dynamic measure) and quality of service (Marques, 2008) . A possible explanation for this is the fact that, for ideological reasons, local governments may be contracting out services as a measure of last resort. In other words, concessionary companies may be endowed with those water systems that have higher infrastructural problems (for which local governments have no direct solution), and this situation might be penalizing the efficiency scores of private utilities. Moreover, private companies pay generous upfront rents to the municipalities to enter the market.
The Italian case
In the north of Italy there are many rivers and lakes, in contrast to the central-southern regions where water is scarce. In the latter regions, water utilities are less efficient (with regard to the use of labour) and also apply the highest tariffs (Guerrini et al., 2011) . In addition, sewage treatment coverage is inferior. A comprehensive reform of the water sector began in January 1994 in this country (with the Galli law). The reform had the purpose of integrating water services (drinking water supply and wastewater collection and treatment) and merging utilities in order to exploit economies of scale and scope. Moreover, it aimed to replace the in-house supply of services by municipalities, entrusting water services to corporatized firms, and to ensure tariffs that cover both current costs and future investments. Each region defined its ATO (Ambiti Territoriali Ottimali, or optimal territorial areas) depending on the natural water basins and with the aim of avoiding an excessive fragmentation of services (more than 7,800 utilities existed before the reform; Canitano et al., 2008) .
A total of 91 ATOs were defined in Italy (COVIRI, 2009 ). The population and area of each ATO varies; there are ATOs serving an entire region and others only serving a specific urban aggregate (e.g. Milan). Currently, water and wastewater services (referred to as SII) can either be delegated to a private or mixed-ownership company (iPPP) where the private partners should be selected through a public tender. Alternatively, they can be delegated to a publicly-owned company. Either way, each operator/system remains a natural monopoly in their specific geographical area.
Water utilities are regulated and audited by local regulatory authorities (Autorità d'Ambito Territoriale Ottimale, or AATOs). The relationship between the AATOs and regulated utilities is characterized by information asymmetries which have to be managed through a transparent reporting system based on each company's performance and on yardstick competition (Marques, 2006) . Every AATO must determine an appropriate tariff and make sure that regulated utilities comply with it.
After more than 15 years, the reform's objectives have not yet been completely achieved, although some steps forward have been taken. In 2008, only 69 of 91 AATOs entrusted SII to 114 firms, covering 66% of the Italian population. Half of these 114 firms are government-owned companies. Many firms integrate drinking water supply and wastewater collection and treatment while others also provide gas, electricity and solid waste services.
The Galli law also created a national committee for water resources (the Commissione Nazionale di Vigilanza sulle Risorse Idriche -COVIRI) to support the Ministry for the Environment in monitoring the application of the regulatory rules (Carrozza, 2011) . COVIRI has responsibilities regarding the definition and fine-tuning of water service tariffs and consumer protection. One of the main goals of this entity is to ensure the effectiveness, efficiency and economic sustainability of the utilities. The committee can propose sanctions against operators who fail to adhere to the principles prescribed by the Galli law. However, so far, COVIRI has never had the resources to operate as an effective national regulator, as was supposed in the Galli reform.
Currently, the water industry in Italy is the focus of a vast political debate. The Italian government enacted a new law (no. 133/2008 art. 23-bis, modified in November 2009) which encouraged private or mixed management of SII. The aim of this reform was to improve SII performance through the inclusion of private investors, since the Italian government considered that model to be more effective and efficiency-oriented than those involving public ownership. However, in June 2011 a highly debated and participated referendum was held on these issues. As an outcome, the AATOs are now not required to delegate SII to mixed or privately-owned firms.
A brief comparison
Currently, the water sectors in both countries are unstable. In addition to being essential for the wellbeing of their populations, water services have a latent economic interest. Local governments try to retain control and discretion over services but the pressures to remove barriers to entry in the market are increasing. Moreover, the use of PPP arrangements is often seen by local decision-makers as the only feasible way to cope with constraints on public debt (Carrozza, 2011) .
The reforms undertaken have had several positive outcomes, especially in terms of quality of service; see Danesi et al. (2007) and Guerrini et al. (2011) on Italian reform, and Carvalho & Marques (2011) and Marques (2008) on the Portuguese situation. Table 1 provides an overview of the water sectors in both countries as they were in 2007 (the year for which we compute the efficiencies of the utilities; see Section 4).
Although the statistics for drinking water and wastewater in Table 1 are in line with other developed countries , both countries still face several important challenges. In Portugal there is an urgent need to improve the overall productivity of the sector (several utilities struggle to break even) and to clarify the role of the central state as an operator/regulator (Marques, 2006) . In Italy, the main problems have to do with the very long time that the Galli reform is taking to be carried out and with the absence of open tender procedures for the selection of private partners on several occasions, especially as the minority shareholders of mixed companies (Asquer, 2011) . In addition, the outcome of the 2011 referendum has defined a framework that is still hazy and unstable with regard to both governance choices and the process of tariff setting.
Performance of water utilities and cross-national comparisons
Since the 1970s the performance evaluation of water utilities has been carried out mainly using several key performance indicators organized in a report, e.g. as scorecards (Yepes & Dianderas, 1996; Tynan & Kingdom, 2002) or through overall performance scores which synthesize the trends of a group of variables, e.g. financial ratios (Guerrini et al., 2011) , non-parametric methods such as DEA (Thanassoulis, 2000) , and parametric methods such as regression analysis (Corton, 2003) , into a single measure.
Partial measures (single dimension indicators) are intuitive and easy to compute. However, if used to compare the performance of a multitude of firms, they can lead to misinterpretations and do not allow for the definition of an overall performance ranking (Marques, 2008) . Indeed, the weakness of these measures is their failure to cover all inputs, outputs and explanatory factors that are relevant to the performance of the decision-making units (DMUs).
Both parametric and non-parametric methods have been used to study the influence of ownership, company size, diversification and geographical location on performance (for an overview on the strengths and limitations of both methods see Fried et al., 2008) . The aim has been to determine which would be the best ownership and regulatory structure, to investigate the existence of economies of scale and scope, and to look at the different performance levels achieved in distinct regions or countries (Berg & Marques, 2011) .
With regard to ownership structure, some researchers have reported that this variable does not influence performance (e.g. García-Sánchez, 2006; Seroa da Motta & Moreira, 2006; Saal et al., 2007) . The same happens with market structure. Some authors defend the existence of economies of scale and economies of scope (between different activities, such as water and wastewater, or levels of integration between the 'wholesale' and 'retail' segments) while others prove the opposite (the existence of diseconomies of scale and scope). This lack of clear convergence can be analysed in the meta-analysis surveys of Abbott & Cohen (2009) and Berg & Marques (2011) . Several papers published in the past few years have studied the different levels of efficiency achieved in distinct regions within the same country (e.g. see García-Valiñas & Muñiz, 2007; Alsharif et al., 2008) . However, cross-national benchmark studies are rare. Some recent exceptions can be found in the literature, such as Corton & Berg (2009) and Clarke et al. (2004) for the Netherlands, England and Wales, Australia, Portugal and Belgium. All these studies struggle with the comparability of data which depend on numerous factors. Nevertheless, the cases of Portugal and Italy are especially suitable for this kind of comparison since many important features, such as institutional environment and climate, are similar for both countries (Carvalho & Marques, 2011) .
Research into the consequences of reforms in the water sector is also scarce. However, there is a growing notion that the privatization of water utilities, as a strategic solution for the sector, lacks any empirical confirmation (Anwandter & Ozuna, 2002) . Besides considering the effects of different ownership and governance structures on performance, academics and practitioners should also focus on the regulatory framework of the sector (Bel et al., 2010) . Privatization by itself will not be an optimal answer if not accompanied by an adequate level of competition for the market and by mechanisms to reduce information asymmetries. Moreover, 'any reform intending to increase coverage (either through commercialization, private sector participation, additional investment or increasing efficiency) should be accompanied by the appropriate social policies' (Prasad, 2007: 21) . Nevertheless, one can find some encouraging reports of reforms in developing countries (Brocklehurst & Janssens, 2004; Brunner et al., 2010) . We believe that this type of 'reality check' is also crucial for developed countries that have carried out massive reforms in the water sector.
Efficiency of water utilities
Methodological approach: data envelopment analysis
To compute the efficiency scores of the DMUs, we used DEA, a non-parametric technique. This type of methodology lets the data speak for themselves without imposing, a priori, any assumptions regarding production conditions (for further discussion of this technique see Fried et al., 2008) . Thus, non-parametric techniques demand fewer requirements from the data than parametric techniques (since the latter techniques assume an aprioristic production or cost function that has the technology embedded). The DEA methodology was developed by Charnes et al. (1978) and, using an input orientation and assuming constant returns to scale (CRS) technology and strong disposability of inputs, efficiency estimates can be computed by solving the following linear programming problem, where x [ < p þ are the inputs used to produce the outputs y [ < q þ , and θ is the DEA CRS efficiency scores for a given DMU:
This technique allows for the determination of the best practice frontier (and thus the comparison of each DMU with this frontier). It is assumed that the technology of an observation i(i¼1, … ,n) is characterized by the production set Ψ, where C ¼ ðx; yÞ [ < pþq þ jx can produce y È É , and that there is free disposability of inputs and outputs, and convexity of production in set Ψ. The best DMUs show an efficiency estimate equal to one, while inefficient DMUs will achieve below this value.
The best practice frontier can be determined considering CRS or variable returns to scale (VRS) technologies. While in CRS estimation assumes that every DMU operates at an optimal scale, VRS estimation only compares similar DMUs (i.e. DMUs operating at the same scale; Banker et al., 1984) . VRS estimates (θ) are obtained from the previous expression by adding the constraint P n i¼1 g i ¼ 1. If a water utility has a CRS efficiency score equal to its VRS efficiency score (i.e. if θ CRS ¼θ VRS ), this means that the DMU operates in a setting with CRS, having a scale efficiency (SE) equal to one (SE¼θ CRS /θ VRS ). By contrast, if a DMU presents an SE,1 it means that that utility operates in a setting with increasing returns to scale (IRS) technology or decreasing returns to scale (DRS) technology. In our case, if a utility operates at IRS, it means that its SE would improve (i.e. its CRS efficiency score would be higher) if it could increase the output level. In other words, to increase the output level, a utility operating at IRS would also have to increase its input level, but at a lower rate. The opposite happens for utilities operating at DRS (whereas for efficient utilities operating at CRS, the inputs and outputs vary at the same rate).
To find if each utility is operating with IRS or DRS it is necessary to solve an additional DEA program imposing non-increasing returns to scale (NIRS). This is accomplished by adding the constraint P n i¼1 g i 1 to Equation (1 
Data and model specification
We collected data from 88 utilities (33 from Italy and 55 from Portugal) for the year 2007 (see Table 2 ). The data were retrieved by the authors from the annual account reports published by the water utilities, as well as from the sector-specific regulators. In particular, Italian data were obtained from COVIRI and collected directly from companies. Portuguese data were mainly obtained from the annual account reports requested from the water utilities and complemented with information in ERSAR's 2007 annual sector report.
All utilities in our sample (both Portuguese and Italian) provide water and wastewater services and a number of Portuguese utilities are also responsible for other services (e.g. urban waste); in these cases, we removed the costs relative to other services for computation of the efficiency estimates. As expected, in both countries the most common ownership structure is that related to publicly-owned utilities. One interesting difference is the private sector participation model. According to our sample, while in Italy most PPPs are of the institutional type (mixed companies or iPPPs), in Portugal contractual PPPs (concessions or cPPPs) are the most common models 1 . Table 3 shows data for the selected variables for Italy, Portugal and for the two countries combined. Italian utilities have higher values in every variable (especially unitary or per utility values). The utilities represented by the Italian data samples encompass about 22% of the country's population, whilst the Portuguese samples cover 47% of the country's population (according to EUROSTAT estimates for 2007).
Since the DEA method accounts for the necessary inputs to produce a certain level of outputs (input orientation), it is necessary to specify a model including them at an adequate aggregation level. We use an input orientation because the aim of water utilities is to reduce resource consumption and not increase the market share (Berg & Marques, 2011) . For this study we specified two models. The inputs and outputs adopted for each model are presented in Table 4 . While in Model 1 we only use costs as inputsstaff costs, capital costs (CAPEX) and other operation and maintenance costs (OOPEX) -in Model 2 we use quantities (although we also use OOPEX). The two selected outputs allow us to control for fixed revenues (population served) and variable revenues (revenue water volume). Table 4 . Inputs and outputs adopted for the DEA models.
Inputs Outputs Table 5 shows the global efficiency estimates for Italian and Portuguese water utilities, for both models and using CRS and VRS approaches. It also shows the average efficiencies of public, mixed and private utilities. If the CRS and VRS efficiency estimates of a given DMU are not equal, it means that the DMU is not operating at an optimal scale. Moreover, using an input orientation, the difference between an efficiency score and the unity represents the potential (percentage) to reduce the mix of inputs consumed to produce the same quantity of outputs. This reduction could be achieved with the improvement of both SE and pure technical efficiency.
Results
In international comparisons, it is important to take into account the purchasing power parity of each country. Hence, we also computed the efficiency scores with the adjusted costs using OECD indicators for 2007 (see Table 6 ). As can easily be seen, Italian utilities appear to be slightly more efficient than their Portuguese counterparts (except for CRS estimates using Model 1). Concerning ownership structure, public utilities seem to be most efficient whilst private (concessionary) companies produced the worst efficiency scores. However, one should bear in mind that almost all concessionary companies in our sample were Portuguese utilities; therefore we are unable to provide a verdict on the performance of this specific governance model in Italy. Furthermore, for the reasons already stated, the true effects of private ownership should also be tested using a productivity analysis (and perhaps an analysis regarding the quality of service) over a representative period of time.
The best practice frontier for the CRS-Model 1 specification is shaped by nine utilities (three Italian and six Portuguese which have efficiency scores equal to one). For the CRS-Model 2, 12 utilities are considered efficient (five Italian and seven Portuguese).
There is no statistical evidence for a significant difference between the efficiencies of Portugal and Italy. In fact, the results of non-parametric tests (Mann-Whitney U, Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Kruskal-Wallis) show that the distributions of the efficiencies are similar for both countries. One exception is the difference between the average SE for Portuguese and Italian utilities; the difference of approximately 6% between the averages (see Figure 1 ) is statistically significant (at the 5% level) employing a simple T-Test on the estimates of Model 1. This is an unexpected result. Indeed, one would expect that the Italian reform of the water sector would have improved the overall SE of the utilities. Nevertheless, two phenomena may be occurring: (1) the smaller scale of the Portuguese utilities may be better suited to the vertical disintegration carried out in that country; and (2) some Italian utilities are too big (furthermore, the Italian utilities in our sample only provide water and wastewater services and might be losing the opportunity to exploit potential economies of scope, e.g. regarding urban waste services).
Concluding remarks
In practical terms, the reforms undertaken by Portugal and Italy in the water sector had similar trends (trying to remove barriers to entry) but also crucial differences (vertical disintegration in Portugal and definition of 'optimal areas' for the integrated systems in Italy). The performance results obtained for both countries highlight significant levels of inefficiency. In Portugal, water (and wastewater) utilities show an average potential for improvement of around 36% (when considering Model 1), of which 12% correspond to SE gains. In Italy, water services show an average potential for improvement of around 38% (when considering Model 1), of which 18% correspond to SE gains. This means that, on average, each utility could reduce the consumption of inputs (mainly OPEX and CAPEX) by these percentages and produce the same quantity of outputs. When we compare the purchasing power parity adjusted results with the unadjusted results, we conclude that this amendment does matter and that Italian water utilities are penalized if this is not taken into account. Indeed, the costs in Italy are higher and most of them are explained by the higher cost of living in that country when compared to Portugal.
Concerning the outcomes of the two models, some interesting conclusions can be drawn. The first, concerning Model 1, is that Italian water utilities are more efficient than Portuguese utilities with the VRS model (where scale effects are accounted for) as opposed to the current state of affairs of the CRS model (where scale is irrelevant). However, when we remove the effect of scale, the opposite happens, i.e. the Portuguese utilities are more efficient. This means that, unexpectedly, it is not clear that the reforms undertaken in Italy have allowed for the effective exploitation of economies of scale in all cases.
Note that both countries reformed the market structure of their water sectors in the 1990s with the objective of becoming more efficient. Nevertheless, it seems that the outcomes in Italy are more evident, with pure technical efficiency being higher for Italian utilities. When we compare the results of Model 2, this effect is not observable as we are dealing with two inputs in quantity units, and the input mains length is only a proxy of the CAPEX. The mains length cannot be reduced (in an input orientation model) and as such it should be considered to be non-discretionary (Banker & Morey, 1986) .
Another interesting result is that water utilities with public ownership seem more efficient than the private ones. Although this is not an atypical result in the literature, it means that the reforms in both countries, which favoured (and continue to favour) the entrance of the private sector, were not necessarily successful. Of course, the 'scissor effect' and high rents can partially justify the performance scores. However, these scores point to some failures in the reforms and in the regulation of private sector participation. Surprisingly, mixed companies appear to be more efficient than private (concessionary) companies. This outcome contradicts the literature where mixed companies are often seen as the 'worst of two worlds'; see Eckel & Vining (1985) and, more recently, Cruz & Marques (2012) . A productivity analysis over a period of a few years would be relevant to test these results.
Finally, we should highlight that there is, unequivocally, room for improvement in the efficiency of both the Portuguese and Italian water industries, and that this kind of study could contribute to ameliorating the current situation. However, to effectively evaluate the reforms that took place in the water sectors of these two countries, panel data with information from before and after the reforms should also be considered.
Despite not yet being able to do this, the cross-sectional analysis carried out in this paper provides strong evidence of how important it is to account for the real impacts of the reforms.
